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Option framing effect is the phenomena that participants often accept more options
when they are asked to delete undesired options from a full model (subtractive framing)
than they do when they are instructed to add desired options to a base model (additive
framing). Whether the same effect exists in different age groups is less well known.
To explore the roles of age and purchase motivations on the option framing effect for
automobiles purchases, this study adopted a 3 (age group: younger, middle-aged, vs.
older) × 2 (option framing: additive vs. subtractive) × 2 (focus condition: information
vs. emotion) mixed design. To manipulate purchase motivations, participants in the
three age groups were instructed to focus on the ratio of utility and price of options
(information-focus) or the extent of pleasure induced by the options (emotion-focus)
when they made purchase decisions in two framing conditions. The results revealed
similar option framing effect across all age groups in the information-focus condition
regarding the total price paid for accepted options. In contrast, the framing effect
was not found in the emotion-focus condition. In addition, older adults accepted more
options and an overall higher price than younger and middle-aged adults in both focus
conditions. This difference was more obvious in the emotion-focus condition than in
the information-focus condition. Moreover, both the number of accepted options and
the total accepted price of the younger group in the information-focus condition were
higher than those in the emotion-focus condition, whereas the older and middle-aged
groups accepted same number of options and price between two focus conditions.
These results imply that purchase motivation is a moderator of the option framing effect
and age characteristics linked with motivations must be considered in sales.
Keywords: emotion, information, age, decision, framing effects
INTRODUCTION
With the development of society and the economy, customers and their needs have grown
increasingly diverse. Mass customization, which permits customers to select desired products and
services, is considered to be the main mode of production (Gilmore and Pine, 1997; Da Silveira
et al., 2001). Park et al. (2000) conducted research into automobile customization in order to
investigate the framing effect. They employed “additive” and “subtractive” framing techniques to
a series of decision tasks. The former framing presented customers with a base model and asked
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them to add the options they wanted. The more options added,
the higher the price. The latter framing presented participants
with a fully loaded product and asked them to delete options that
they did not want. The price decreased as the number of deleted
options increased. If all alternative options in the full model were
deleted, the final price of the automobile equaled the price of the
base model. The results showed that customers tended to choose
more options with a higher total option price when they used
subtractive rather than additive option framing, a finding that
indicates the option framing effect. Levin et al. (2002) also found
a similar framing effect in the purchase of pizza, a non-durable
and less expensive item than an automobile. Framing effects have
been found in automobile customization (Biswas and Grau, 2008;
Goldstein et al., 2008; Biswas, 2009; Yang, 2010), condominium
purchase (Pornpitakpan, 2009), mobile communication services
(Jin et al., 2009), package tour services (Jin et al., 2012), and
computer warranties (Dong, 2012).
Loss aversion, which depends on a reference point, is regarded
as the main influential factor of the option framing effect
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1985; Johnson et al.,
1993). The prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) asserts that gains and losses are
evaluated from a subjective reference point and individuals often
weigh losses more than gains. When an alternative is used as
a reference state or anchor, individuals will evaluate the losses
from that state more than gains. For additive framing, a consumer
reference point is the base model, whereas in subtractive framing,
it is the fully loaded model. Hence, customers weigh gains and
losses, based on different reference points. In additive framing,
they need to assess the gains of adding option utilities and
economic losses. In subtractive framing, they must weigh utility
lost in deleting options and economic gains. Thus, customers
are more likely to delete fewer products to avoid utility loss in
subtractive framing, whereas, in additive framing, the customers
are more likely to add fewer products to avoid economic loss.
Research on the option framing effect has mainly focused on
younger adults (Park et al., 2000; Levin et al., 2002; Biswas and
Grau, 2008; Biswas, 2009; Pornpitakpan, 2009; Jin et al., 2012).
Whether the same effect exists for older adults is less well known.
Research has shown that older and younger adults differ in
their cognitive resources and behavior motivations (Schaie, 1994;
Carstensen et al., 1999; Carstensen, 2006). Such age differences
may affect the framing effects in different age groups.
Older adults have less cognitive resources than younger adults,
which may lead to age differences in the option framing effect.
It has been well established in the literature that cognitive
abilities, such as processing speed, working memory, inhibition,
episode memory, word fluency, spatial orientation, and reasoning
decline linearly with increasing gage (Schaie, 1994; Salthouse,
1996, 2009; Baltes and Lindenberger, 1997; Shen et al., 2003;
Anstey et al., 2012). This may affect the decision making of
older adults. In addition, research has linked loss aversion to
affective processes as opposed to deliberative processes (Biswas,
2009; Peters et al., 2011). Biswas (2009) found that customers
had a larger option framing effect when making decision in an
experiential mode and that the effect diminished when making
decisions in a rational mode. The experiential/affective mode
produces thoughts and feelings in a relatively effortless and
spontaneous manner. The operations of this mode are typically
rapid, automatic, intuitive, and appear to be based primarily on
affective (emotional) feelings (Peters et al., 2011). If cognitive
constraints become high, the option framing effect is shown to
increase (Biswas and Grau, 2008). This phenomenon may arise
because participants with greater cognitive constraints are more
likely to use the experiential mode to make decisions. In contrast,
when participants were asked to explain their choice (Miller and
Fagley, 1991) or provide the rationale behind their selections
(Sieck and Yates, 1997; Simon et al., 2004), framing effects were
significantly reduced. The weakened cognitive resources of older
adults may make them less dependent on controlled processing in
decision making, which may lead to decision biases. For example,
decreased processing speed and working memory can predict the
lower decision quality of older adults (Henninger et al., 2010).
Research has shown older adults tend to search less information
and use simpler, less cognitively demanding strategies in their
decision making (Mata et al., 2007). According to these findings,
we may infer that older adults have larger option framing effects
because of their reduced cognitive resources.
From the experimental mode perspective, emotional
processing often leads to older adults performing more poorly
in decision making tasks than younger adults. However,
research based on socioemotional selectivity theory found that
emotion played a different role in older adults’ decision making.
Socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen et al., 1999;
Carstensen, 2006) maintains that two broad categories of social
goals shift in importance as a function of perceived time: those
concerning the acquisition of knowledge and those concerning
the regulation of stated emotions. When time is perceived as
open-ended, goals focus on knowledge acquisition. This refers to
acquisitive behavior geared toward learning about the social and
physical world, including gathering information, experiencing
novelty, and expanding knowledge. When time is perceived as
constrained, the most salient goals tend to emphasize emotions
and in particular, regulate emotional states. The delineation
of two social goals concerns those who are primarily aimed at
gaining knowledge or preparing for the future and those aimed at
satisfying their emotional needs in the moment (Carstensen et al.,
1999). Younger adults have wide time horizons and pursue goals
related to knowledge. Older adults have restricted time horizons
and therefore pursue goals related to emotion (Carstensen et al.,
1999).
The difference in behavior motivations (social goals) may
influence age differences in decision making. Fung and
Carstensen (2003) found that in comparison to non-emotional
advertisements, emotional advertisements were preferred and
more readily remembered by older adults compared to younger
adults. Löckenhoff and Carstensen (2007) investigated the
differences between older and younger adults when making
health care decisions. They found that older adults reviewed
and recalled a greater proportion of positive rather than
negative information compared to younger adults, when no
extra instruction of motivation (control condition) existed. When
motivational manipulations elicited information-gathering goals,
these age differences were eliminated. In follow-up research
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(Löckenhoff and Carstensen, 2008) older adults exhibited a
similar positive effect when they choose doctors for a social
partner of a similar age. Moreover, different social goals also
affected the decision quality of older adults. When they were
instructed to focus on their feelings about health care choices
(emotion-focus), their decision quality was better than when they
focused on specific attributes and details (information-focus). In
comparison, younger adults performed better in the information-
focused condition than in the control condition (Mikels et al.,
2010). In our study investigating a risky-choice framing effect,
we found that in a high emotion arousal framing task (life-saving
task), older adults did not exhibit framing effects while younger
adults displayed the classic framing effect (Pu et al., unpublished).
This is contrary to the assumption that older adults would show
greater decision bias and poor decision quality because of their
dependence on the experiential/affective processing mode.
In summary, we infer that decisions based on experiential
mode would likely be different from decisions based on
emotional goals. While decision making in experiential mode
refers to how people process information, this conclusion does
not suggest that the goal of decision making is to optimize
emotions. Emotion goals based decision making does imply the
aim of decision making, however, this process is not necessarily
intuitive. It is our position that there will be a difference in
the ultimate decision made based on the process of reaching
that decision. Research has found that positivity effects based on
emotional goals were only shown by older adults with access to
greater cognitive resources (Mather and Knight, 2005). Decision-
making based on emotional goals may therefore reflect controlled
processing. Experiential mode requires fewer cognitive resources;
thus, cognitive resource limitations make older decision makers
more reliant on this processing mode. Processing based on
emotional goals is not necessary affected by cognitive resources.
Its decision goal is to optimize emotion, rather than to save
cognitive resources. Though a link has been established between
loss aversion and emotional reactions to losses and gains, it does
not mean the direct purchase motivations of customers are to
satisfy emotions. If a customer’s purpose is to satisfy emotions,
the subjective value of losses and gains may not influence the
purchase decision. Hence, in this study, customers’ purchase
motivations are considered and age differences in the option
framing effect connected with different purchase motivations will
also be investigated.
The current study examined firstly any age differences for
the option framing effect in the purchase of automobiles. Three
age groups—younger, middle-aged, and older—were included,
to enable an exploration of the option framing effect in the
life-span context. From the loss aversion and experiential mode
perspectives, it can be inferred that the option framing effect will
increase as age increases, because cognitive resource attenuate
with aging. However, the predicted age differences may be
moderated by purchase motivations.
Secondly, we explored the role of purchase motivations and
any interaction with age in the option framing effect. Two types
of purchase motivations were examined. One is focused on
information, which emphasizes the purchase decisions on the
ratio of utility and price of options. The other motivation is
focused on emotion, which emphasizes the purchase decisions
on the extent of pleasure induced by options. For example, a
customer may decide to buy a product only because it can
produce a positive state of emotion regardless of utility and price.
In the information-focus condition, the purchase motivation is
connected to finding options with a high ratio of utility and
price regardless of customers’ feeling, such as like or dislike of a
particular option. Selecting or rejecting an option means a gain of
utility/price or vice versa. Thus, loss aversion and reference point
may affect the decisions of customers, which produce the option
framing effect. It is hypothesized that older adults will exhibit
a larger option framing effect than younger and middle-aged
adults. Since middle-aged adults maintain comparative cognitive
abilities in comparison to younger adults in longitudinal change
(Schaie, 1994) they may have a similar framing effect to younger
adults. To compare age differences for the option framing
effect, analysis of variance (ANOVA) was utilized. A significant
main effect of framing (additive vs. subtractive) would indicate
that the option framing effect exists. An interaction effect of
age × framing would indicate age differences exist within the
option framing effect, namely, the option framing effect in the
older age group would be larger than in the younger and middle-
aged groups. In the emotion-focus condition, the extent of
pleasure induced by options is explicit. Selecting or rejecting
an option produces a gain of pleasure or a loss of displeasure,
respectively. It is predicted there will be no trade-off between
gains and losses. Therefore, loss aversion may not affect decision
making and the option framing effect may not appear across three
age groups.
In addition, we are also interesting in identifying which age
group will spend more money on automobiles irrespective of
option framing. The utility and price of options are stressed in
the information-focus condition. Selecting or rejecting an option
may represent an advantage of the automobile with high utility
or not wasting money. In contrast, the emotion-focus condition
emphasizes the emotion meaning of options. An option that
represents a high level of pleasure may be expensive or not be
useful in daily life, but it could make individuals to feel happy
in the moment. Thus, the number of options and purchase
amounts paid by the three age groups in the two alternate focus
conditions may be different. The results of this problem may give
us some suggestions in sale strategies from the perspective of age
characteristics.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Three age groups, each with 60 healthy participants, were
compared in this study. Sixty younger adults aged between 23
and 30 years (40 men and 20 women, M = 26.75, SD = 2.17),
60 middle-aged adults aged between 40 and 49 years (41 men
and 19 women, M = 44.70, SD = 2.78), and 60 older adults
between 60 and 83 years of age (30 men and 30 women
M = 66.08, SD = 5.57) were recruited. The younger and
middle-aged adults were company employees recruited through
advertisements. The older adults were community residents
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recruited through advertisements. All participants were paid for
30CNY as compensation.
Participants in each age group were randomly assigned to
one of two conditions: information-focus and emotion-focus. As
shown in Table 1, there were significant differences in annual
income [F(2,174) = 66.49, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.433] and education
level [F(2,174) = 65.07, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.428] among the
three age groups. The older group had significantly fewer years
of education than the middle-aged and young groups. The
difference between the middle-aged and young age groups was
not significant on either variable. In addition, the older group
had a significantly lower annual income than did the middle-aged
and young groups. Although the annual income of the young
group was slightly higher than older group, the difference was
not significant. There was no significant differences of education
years [F(2,174)= 0.67, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.004] and annual income
[F(2,174) = 2.20, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.012] between two focus
conditions regardless of age group. Thus, we included the years
of education and annual income as covariates in our analysis.
Design
This study was a 3 (age group: young, middle-aged, vs.
older) × 2 (option framing: additive vs. subtractive) × 2
(focus condition: information vs. emotion) design, with the
age and focus conditions treated as between-subjects variables
and option framing as a within-subjects variable. In previous
studies investigating the option framing effect, option framing is
typically designed as a between-subjects variable. Since individual
differences may confound the effect of a between-subjects
variable, option framing was designed as within-subjects variable
in current study. This design also contributed to economic
participation. As outlined in the Materials sub-section, in order to
avoid participants making repeated decisions for same scenario,
option framing was a within-subjects and between-materials
design. The number and total price of the options accepted were
included as the dependent variables. The accepted options in
additive framing refer to those options participants added to the
base model. The accepted options in subtractive framing refer
to those remaining options after participant deductions from
the full model. Thus, both accepted options in the two framing
conditions represent a participant decision to buy.
The option framing manipulation asked participants to select
a series of options that they would add to the base model and
delete from the full model, according to the respective condition.
Participants in the additive conditions viewed the base model and
a list of options with their prices, which they could add. The full
set of options added to base model represented the full model.
Conversely, participants in the subtractive conditions viewed the
full model and could delete options, such that deleting all the
options would leave them with the base model.
The instructions were designed to temporally shift
participants’ purchase motivations. Instructional manipulations
in the emotion-focus condition asked participants to focus on
their emotional reactions to the options and then make a choice.
In the information-focus condition, participants were instructed
to focus on the ratio of utility and price and then make a choice.
The emotion refers to the level of pleasure induced by those
options. The utility refers to the extent of perceived usefulness
of those options. To ensure that participants focused on the
instructed condition, they were asked to rate the ratio of utility
and price or pleasure induced by adding or deleting options,
depending on the focus condition, on a 5-point scale ranging
from 1 (very low/very unpleasant) to 5 (very high/very pleasant)
after each selection. This meant that participants in information-
focus condition only rated the ratio of utility and price of the
selected options and participants in the emotion-focus condition
only rated the level of pleasure derived from the selected options.
The instructions for the two focus conditions were derived
from research into older adults’ health care decision making
(Löckenhoff and Carstensen, 2007; Mikels et al., 2010), which are
as follows:
Information-focus condition: “If you want to buy this car, please
only consider the ratio of utility and price of the options. The
utility refers to the extent of usefulness of these options in your
real driving. Which options will you choose?”
Emotion-focus condition: “If you want to buy this car, please
only consider the degree of pleasure of the options. You can
choose whatever option you like. Which options will you
choose?”
Materials
According to the two independent variables, there were four
experimental materials, as showed in Table 2.
As previously stated, option framing was a within-subjects
and between-materials design. Each participant accepted both
additive and subtractive option framing, but the materials used
in the two framings were different. For example, participant A
accepted Brand A in additive framing and Brand B in subtractive
framing (participant A would thus add options to the base model
of Brand A and delete options from the full model of Brand B).
Participant B accepted Brand A in subtractive framing and Brand
B in additive framing (participant B would delete options from
the full model of Brand A and add options to the base model of
Brand B).
The two brands of cars each had seven options. The options
of the two models differed so as to avoid the interference effect of
repetitive options in the decisions of participants, but the prices
of the options were same. To avoid the obvious different utility of
seven options in each framing, which may lead to selection bias,
ten auto experts were asked to rate the utility of each option on
a 10-point scale. The non-parameter test showed no significant
difference between all pairs of options. The utility values and
prices of the seven options for the two models are presented in
Table 3.
All study material was originally presented in the Chinese
language. Participants were provided with information about
each option before they were asked to make choice. This served to
counterbalance any effect from those with less experience with or
knowledge of automobile products. The materials were presented
to participants on a single page and included a description of the
base/full model, followed by a list of the seven options to be added
or deleted for each model.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1736
fpsyg-07-01736 November 3, 2016 Time: 17:28 # 5
Peng et al. Age Differences in Option Framing
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for age, education, and annual income by age group and focus condition.
Demographic variables Older Middle-aged Young
Information focus Emotion focus Information focus Emotion focus Information focus Emotion focus
M ± SD M ± SD M ± SD M ± SD M ± SD M ± SD
Age 67.10 ± 5.65 65.07 ± 5.38 44.97 ± 2.87 44.43 ± 2.71 26.47 ± 2.22 27.03 ± 2.11
Education (years) 12.97 ± 2.54 12.53 ± 2.70 15.50 ± 0.51 15.53 ± 0.51 15.97 ± .928 15.77 ± 1.01
Annual income (thousands CNY) 40.97 ± 19.51 42.07 ± 18.50 175.33 ± 107.50 146.67 ± 84.46 77.55 ± 29.74 66.00 ± 24.40
TABLE 2 | Material allocations
Focusing condition
Framing
Brand A (+OF)
Brand B (−OF)
Brand A (−OF)
Brand B (+OF)
Information focus Material 1 Material 2
Emotion focus Material 3 Material 4
+OF is additive option framing. −OF is subtractive option framing.
Procedure
Participants were asked to assume that they were facing the
decision of purchasing a car and then instructed to read the
relevant information in the questionnaire about the options
available for the car. Before participants began to choose
their preferred options, the instructions for the emotion-focus
or information-focus conditions were read aloud to focus
participants on different aspects of the alternative options when
making their decision. As previously outlined, after each choice,
participants rated the ratio of utility and price of each added or
deleted option or the level of pleasure induced by the selected
options.
This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
School of Psychology at Beijing Normal University and written
informed consent was obtained from all participants.
RESULTS
The Extent of the Ratio of Utility and
Price/Pleasure of Added/Deleted
Options in Additive/Subtractive Option
Framing
Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the scores from
the ratio of utility and price (or pleasure) when participants
focused on information (or emotion).As shown in Table 4, in
the information-focus condition, the ratio of utility and price
of added options (Mold = 3.85, SD = 0.67; Mmiddle = 4.43,
SD = 0.39; Myoung = 3.95, SD = 0.84) was higher than
that of all deleted options in each age group (Mold = 2.41,
SD = 0.96; Mmiddle = 2.55, SD = 0.47; Myoung = 2.44,
SD = 0.79], F(1,82) = 230.85, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.737, and
the rating scores in middle-aged group were higher than other
two age groups [F(2,82) = 4.06, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.09]. In the
emotion-focus condition, the extent of the pleasure of the added
options was higher than that of all deleted options in each
age group, F(1,73) = 368.84, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.835. There
was no significant age difference in the rating scores. These
results indicate that those options participants decided to buy
were of a higher ratio of utility and price or a greater level of
pleasure.
Number and Total Price of Accepted
Options in Different Focus Conditions
Repeated measures ANOVAs, with the age grouping and focus
conditions as between-subjects variables, option framing as a
within-subjects variable, and years of education and annual
income as covariates, were conducted. After controlling for
education and annual income [accept number, F(1,172) = 0.004,
p> 0.05, η2p= 0.000; F(1,172)= 1.37, p> 0.05, η2p= 0.008; accept
price, F(1,172) = 0.02, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.000; F(1,172) = 1.58,
p > 0.05, η2p = 0.009], option framing × age × focus
condition interactions were not found for the number of
accepted options [F(2,172) = 1.70, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.19] or
the total price paid for the options [F(2,172) = 2.08, p > 0.05,
η2p = 0.024]. The main effect of option framing and focus
condition for the number and total price of chosen options was
also non-significant. The descriptive statistics are presented in
Table 5.
A significant interaction of framing × focus condition on
the total price paid for the options [F(1,172) = 3.96, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.022] was found. For the number of accepted options,
the interaction of framing × focus condition was not significant
[F(1,172) = 3.33, p = 0.07, η2p = 0.019] but showed a similar
pattern to the total price.
As shown in Figure 1, a simple effects test revealed
the significant effect of option framing in the information-
focus condition for the total price of the accepted options
[F(1,172) = 12.42, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.067]. The total price
(3287.78 ± 840.52) in subtractive framing was higher than that
in additive framing (2775.56 ± 1159.3). In the emotion-focus
condition, the differences in the accepted price between the
two framing conditions were not significant, F(1,172) = 0.49,
p > 0.05, η2p = 0.003. The results suggest that the option framing
effect, as index by total price, appeared when participants focused
on the ratio of utility and price. In contrast, the effect disappeared
when participants focused on individual personal emotion.
The main effects of age for both number [F(2,172) = 16.97,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.165] and the total price of the accepted
options [F(2,172) = 15.36, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.152] were
significant. The number of options (10.27 ± 2.62) and total
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TABLE 3 | Prices and utility scores of the two models’ seven options.
Number Options of Brand A Price
(CNY)
Mean score
of value
Options of Brand B Price
(CNY)
Mean score
of value
p
(1) Electric foldable outside mirrors 700 8.2 Outside rear-view mirror (dimming) 700 8.7 0.262
(2) Adjustable headlamp (scope) 600 8.3 Headlight height adjustable 600 8.5 0.414
(3) Outside mirror with heater 700 7.1 Outside rear-view mirror electric adjustment 700 7.8 0.059
(4) Console screen (LCD) 800 7.7 ECU 800 8.3 0.262
(5) Front parking radar 800 7.6 Reversing radar 800 8.5 0.197
(6) Remote control key 600 7.9 Internally central door lock 600 7.9 1.000
(7) LED taillights 600 8.4 Front fog lamp 600 8.7 0.518
TABLE 4 | The ratio of utility and price/pleasure evaluated by participants
in additive and subtractive framing.
Additive Subtractive
M ± SD M ± SD
Information-focus Older 3.85 ± 0.67 2.41 ± 0.96
(ratio of utility and price)
Middle-aged 4.43 ± 0.39 2.55 ± 0.47
Younger 3.95 ± 0.84 2.44 ± 0.79
Emotion-focus (pleasure) Older 4.32 ± 0.48 2.41 ± 0.58
Middle-aged 4.25 ± 0.32 2.80 ± 0.42
Younger 4.28 ± 0.42 2.73 ± 0.70
price (6990 ± 1812.36) of the older group was significantly
higher (ts < 0.01) than those of the middle-aged group
(8.18 ± 2.14; 5663.33 ± 1446.32) and the younger age group
(7.23 ± 2.91; 5000 ± 2012.33). The difference between the
middle-aged and younger groups was not significant (t > 0.05).
The interaction of age × framing failed to be found [accepted
number, F(2,172) = 0.28, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.003]; accepted price,
[F(2,172) = 0.532, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.006], which indicated
that the age differences were the same regardless of additive
or subtractive framing. However, a significant interaction of
age × focus condition was found for both the number of
accepted options [F(2,164) = 9.94, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.104] and
the total price [F(2,172) = 10.040, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.105].
Simple effects tests showed that the age differences arising
from the number [F(2,172) = 24.36, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.361]
and total price [F(2,172) = 23.12, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.212], in
the emotion-focus condition were greater than those in the
information-focus condition [accepted number, F(2,172) = 5.17,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.057; accepted price, F(2,172) = 4.39, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.049].
Moreover, as shown in Figure 2, simple effects tests of
age × focus condition revealed that, in the younger age
group, the number of options (8.57 ± 2.44) and total
price (5943.33 ± 1678.81) in the information-focus condition
were higher than the number (5.9 ± 2.75) and total price
(4056.67 ± 1891.85) in the emotion-focus condition [accepted
number, F(1,172) = 17.01, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.090; accepted
price, F(1,172) = 18.04, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.095]. This result
demonstrates that young adults are more willing to spend money
for the ratio of utility and price rather than for emotional
satisfaction. For older adults, the number and total price in
the emotion-focus condition were slightly higher than those
in the information-focus condition, but the differences were
not statistically significant [accepted number, F(1,172) = 3.51,
p = 0.063, η2p = 0.020; accepted price, F(1,172) = 3.19,
p= 0.076, η2p = 0.018]. For the middle-aged adults, there were no
differences in the number of options and the price between two
focus conditions [accepted number, F(1,172) = 0.27, p > 0.05,
η2p= 0.002; accepted price, F(1,172)= 0.17, p> 0.05, η2p= 0.001].
DISCUSSION
This study explored the option framing effect of automobile
purchases in different focus conditions. The existence of age
differences within the framing effects was also examined. The
TABLE 5 | Number and total price of accepted options in different focus conditions and option framings.
Older Middle-aged Young
Information Emotion Information Emotion Information Emotion
M ± SD M ± SD M ± SD M ± SD M ± SD M ± SD
Number
Additive 4.67 ± 1.88 5.17 ± 1.74 3.57 ± 1.33 4.20 ± 1.77 3.90 ± 1.67 2.93 ± 1.51
Subtractive 5.00 ± 1.44 5.70 ± 1.42 4.57 ± 0.90 4.03 ± 1.61 4.67 ± 1.30 2.97 ± 1.87
Price (CNY)
Additive 3170 ± 1298.32 3493.33 ± 1229.78 2466.67 ± 916.64 3183.33 ± 590.20 2690 ± 1154.11 1993.33 ± 1062.51
Subtractive 3426.67 ± 995.83 3890 ± 977.81 2943.33 ± 1193.86 2733.33 ± 1102.14 3253.33 ± 892.01 2063.33 ± 1277.25
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FIGURE 1 | The total price of participants’ accepted options in the two
framing conditions.
results showed that the option framing effect regarding the
total price paid for the accepted options was significant in
the information-focus condition. The index for the number of
accepted options showed a similar pattern but did not reach
statistical significance. Participants accepted higher prices in
subtractive framing than they did in additive framing. No age
difference for the framing effect was found in the information-
focus condition. When participants made decisions based on
their feelings about the options, the framing effect did not
occur in any of the age groups, irrespective of the accepted
number or price. In addition, the number of options and
the price accepted by older adults were higher than those
accepted by young and middle-aged adults, and this difference
was more obvious in the emotion-focus condition than in the
information-focus condition. Moreover, the number of accepted
options and total accepted price of the younger age group
in the information-focus condition were higher than those
in the emotion-focus condition, whereas the older accepted a
slightly higher number of options and price in the emotion-
focus condition than in information-focus condition, although
the differences were not significant. The middle-aged adults
accepted same number of options and price in the two focus
conditions.
Purchase Motivation Is One of the
Moderators of the Option Framing Effect
Though considerable research in psychology (Shafir, 1993),
organizational behavior (Huber et al., 1987), and marketing
(Biswas and Grau, 2008) has testified to the different roles of
additive and subtractive framings in many situation (customers
tended to accept more products and higher prices in subtractive
framing), moderators of the option framing effect have been
identified. Product categories, prices, anticipated regrets (Park
et al., 2000), culture differences (Levin et al., 2002), and cognitive
constraints (Biswas and Grau, 2008) have been shown to
influence the direction and effect size of framing. The results of
FIGURE 2 | (A) Displays the number of accepted options for each age group
across the different focus conditions. (B) Displays the total price of accepted
options for each age group across the different focus conditions.
our study reveal the existence of a significant option framing
effect in the information-focus condition, which is consistent
with the findings of previous research (Park et al., 2000; Levin
et al., 2002; Biswas and Grau, 2008; Goldstein et al., 2008;
Biswas, 2009; Jin et al., 2009, 2012; Pornpitakpan, 2009; Yang,
2010; Dong, 2012). However, no framing effect was found in the
emotion-focus condition. The current results also demonstrated
that purchase motivation is one of the moderators of the option
framing effect. Prospect theory holds that the option framing
effect derives from the different sensitivities of customers to
gain vs. loss and utility vs. money (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Hardie et al., 1993). The premise of this view is that
purchase motivation stems from the gain in utility value of
product. However, the motivations of customers are usually
diverse (Ratneshwar et al., 1996; Higgins, 2002). The results of
this study demonstrate that the purchase behaviors of customers
are not affected by the different presentations of products, if only
the feelings generated by the options are considered at the time
of decision making. Thus, the existence of moderators of the
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option framing effect should remind managers and marketing
institutions that the premise of this effect must be considered
when they design sale strategies. If customers prefer the emotion
induced by products to their utility and price, option framing will
not take effect.
It is notable that the present results differ from the findings of
Biswas (2009), in which the option framing effect was investigated
in the purchase of automobiles in two processing modes, namely,
rational versus experiential. Younger adults were instructed to
make the optional product choice decisions in a strictly logical
(rational) mode or in an emotional manner (experiential mode).
As a result, the option framing effect was found in the experiential
mode but not in the rational mode. This is contrary to the results
of the present study. There are two possible explanations: first, the
theoretical framework underlying the two studies is not identical.
As previously mentioned the emotion-focus/information-focus
condition emphasized more on the aims of decision making than
the processing mode. As such, the emotion-focus condition is not
similar to experiential mode and the information-focus condition
is not similar to the rational mode. Second, the instructions
in two studies were different, which may have also influenced
participants’ decisions. In Biswas’s study, the instructions for the
experiential mode were “A car purchase is supposed to be an
emotional decision for most people. Therefore, please make your
decisions in an emotional manner rather than one based on strict
logic. That is, try to put your logical reasoning aside, and decide
from an emotional point of view the options that you would want
to add.” We are of the view that the terms emotional manner and
logical may be ambiguous for participants. Whereas, the extent
of pleasure induced by the options and the ratio of utility and
price were explicit in the present study’s instructions, which may
give participants some exact decision basis. Thus, different results
were obtained in present study.
Age and the Option Framing Effect
Age differences within the option framing effect were not found.
All age groups had the same framing effect in the information-
focus condition, whereas the framing effect failed to occur in the
emotion-focus condition across all age groups. Consistent with
our hypothesis, middle-aged adults had the same option framing
effect as younger adults, which may due to their comparative
cognitive abilities that the experiential mode depends upon.
Unexpectedly, older adults did not exhibit more vulnerability
to task presentation in comparison to younger and middle-aged
adults. This finding is not consistent with our hypothesis that
older adults would show a larger framing effect because of their
reduced level of cognitive resources and intuitive processes. There
are three possible explanations: the first is that older adults
may weigh gains and losses differently than younger adults. In
comparison to younger adults, older adults may give gains more
weight because of their positive bias. The “gains seeking” co-exists
with loss aversion in older adults. The gains seeking may produce
a reverse option framing effect, meaning that more options are
accepted under additive framing and fewer options deleted in
subtractive framing. Therefore, a reverse option framing effect is
linked to gains seeking reducing the existence of age differences
in the option framing effect. This is supported by the results
from research conducted into risky-choice framing. Using the
monetary gambling task, Mikels and Reed (2009) discovered
that when a decision task was personally relevant (participants
received an amount of money proportional to their “winnings”),
older adults were not influenced by framing and showed risk
aversion in both framings. They attribute this result to the
positive bias of older adults, which made them give less weight
to losses than to gains. Thus, they did not show risk seeking in
loss framing. The second reason is the confounding effect of older
adults’ life experiences. Rönnlund et al. (2005) maintained that
the life experiences of older adults compensated for their lesser
cognitive resources, which explained why they did not show a
larger framing effect than that of younger adults. Peters et al.
(2011) reviewed the research on age differences among preference
construction and concluded that preference was less constructed
when older adults faced a familiar decision task. In the example
of a daily shopping scenario, older adults were less likely to let
the attractiveness of a discounted item influence their decision
making, when its choice would require a larger minimum
purchase than permitted by their usual budget (Tentori et al.,
2001; Kim and Hasher, 2005; Kim et al., 2008). For Chinese older
adults, there may be familiarity with shopping itself. Thus, they
can stick to their shopping principles and not be influenced by
framing. The third reason is the relatively lower level of cognitive
demand of our framing task. In our task, participants can read the
option list on a single page repeatedly and there was no time limit.
Therefore, the demands on working memory and processing
speed were not particularly high. Therefore, older adults did not
construct more preferences than younger adults in the relatively
simple option framing task.
Age and Consumption Decisions
Although an age difference of framing effect was not found,
two other results–the main effect of age and the interaction
effect between age and focusing condition–were significant.
Specifically, older adults tended to select more automobile
options and accept higher prices than did younger and middle-
aged adults, and this age difference was larger in the emotion-
focus condition. In controlling for income, the main effect
of age was still significant; the age difference of the accepted
total price was not the result of the difference in income level
among the three groups. Thus, we infer that the main effect
of age may be related to the emotion regulation goal in older
adults. Shafir (1993) notes that customers preferred “choosing” to
“rejecting” because the former was a simpler task compared to the
latter. Increased negative emotion may result in increased choice
avoidance (Luce, 1998). Due to a greater focus on the emotion
regulation goal, older adults tended to reject fewer options to
avoid negative emotions in subtractive framing. For the same
reason, they were inclined to select more options to optimize the
emotional experience in additive framing. As for why the larger
age differences were found in the emotion-focus condition, it
mainly came from the decrease of the option numbers and prices
accepted by younger adults in that condition. When younger
adults were told to “only consider the degree of pleasure of the
options,” it seems that they paradoxically devalued the options
and accepted fewer options and prices. The exact reasons why
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younger adults were willing to accept great costs in information-
focus condition are needed to be explored furtherly.
The data showed a slight but not significant difference between
the two focusing conditions. Older adults paid slight more money
in the emotion-focus condition than in the information-focus
condition. This may be due to the car purchase task not being
a self-related task for older adults. According to the selective
engagement hypothesis (Hess, 2006), older adults show greater
sensitivity to the self-related implications of a given task and they
may engage more cognitive resources to do those high self-related
task. It may therefore be inferred from this hypothesis that if the
purchase task is highly self-related, such as health care plan for
older adults, they may show a more obvious emotion regulated
tendency.
In addition, participants in the middle-aged group accepted
the same number and price of options in the two focus
conditions. One reason for this result may be that utility, price
and feelings about the products are all important to middle-
aged adults. Such individuals still need to prepare for the future,
such as preparing for retirement and ensuring long-term financial
stability. Meanwhile, middle-aged adults begin to realize future
limitations with increasing age and shift concerns to emotion
satisfaction (Carstensen, 1992; Charles and Carstensen, 1999).
Therefore, they may make the same decisions in the information-
and emotion-focus conditions. The other reason may be that the
total price of cars in our experimental materials was relative low
for middle-aged group in comparison to their income. Though
we controlled for the effect of income, the subjective values of
options for individuals may still affect their decision making. If a
customer regards a product as not particularly valuable, they may
care less about how to select it. In order to explore whether social
goals influence the purchase decisions of middle-aged adults, it
would be of benefit to include products of higher subjective value
into the research design.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present study explored the role of motivations in the option
framing effect among different age groups. The results imply that
age characteristics must be considered in sales. It is suggested that
the use of emotion in persuading older adults and the delivery of
information to persuade younger adults may be effective.
The current study did have some limitations. First, the
cognitive abilities of the three age groups were not directly
measured. Though considerable literature reports a decline in
cognitive ability as age increases, the absence of measurement
of cognitive abilities limits the investigation of whether there
is an interactive effect between motivations and cognitions in
the option framing effect. Second, life experience may influence
preference construction. Participants’ automobiles and general
purchase experience should be objectively measured in future
research. Thus enabling the three age groups with different
purchase experience levels to be compared and the role of life
experience in the option framing effect can be discussed further.
Third, there was no control condition of focus. The absence of
“baseline” condition makes it not clear if participants’ decision
behavior in the information- or emotion-focus condition differs
from typical behaviors for any age group. Finally, rating scores
of the ratio of utility and price or the extent of pleasure of each
choice could illustrate the desired options were higher in ratio
of utility and price or extent of pleasure than undesired options.
Thus, it may not directly examine the decision motivations
of participants. Interviews or self-report capture of decision
motivations from participants would be of benefit in future
research.
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